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THE WAR ON TERROR:
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE IN
A STATE OF PERMANENT
WARFARE?©
BY W. WESLEY PUE"
This article assesses Canada's principal legal
responses to the challenge presented by terrorism in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States. A reviewof major federal "anti-terrorism"
legislation reveals a legislative response that
fundamentally violates core constitutional principles
while failing to significantly enhance public safety.
Cet article analyse les principales rdactions
16gislatives anti-terroristes promulgu~es par le
gouvernement canadien h la suite des attaques du 11
septembre 2001 contre les Etats-Unis. Une 6tude des
principales lois f~drales anti-terroristes indique que ces
derniares enfreignent les principes constitutionnels
fondamentaux des Canadiens sans pour autant
contribuer A accroltre significativement la s~curit6 du
public.
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It is widely assumed that the War on Terror requires re-balancing
society's needs for liberty and security through mechanisms by which
security can be bought only at the price of liberty.
Following September 11, 2001 (9/11), many are prepared to buy
"security" without regard to cost. The urgency of taking steps to prevent
violent attacks on civilians is obvious; remembrance of the thousands
buried by an ocean of rubble cascading from the heavens demands action.
Everyone who has flown in an airplane, visited office towers, or shared
moments of life with bright, spirited people like those who work in places
such as the World Trade Center, can identify with the horror. The
recollection is dreadful, traumatizing, and horrific. However, thinking in
terms of dichotomies such as these is both misleading and dangerous. Clear
thinking is needed if we are to begin to properly assess the issues that face
our society as it confronts the threat of international terrorism. Although
Canada's War on Terror has involved both military deployment (in
Afghanistan and at sea) and law-making at home, my immediate concern
is with the implications of this new War for constitutionalism and the Rule
of Law within Canada.
I. CANADIAN LEGISLATION
Canada responded quickly to 9/11 by introducing theAnti- Terrorism
Act, and the Public Safety Act.1 The former enacts the Charities Registration
(Security Information) Act2 and amends fully twenty other statutes while the
most recent version of the Public Safety Act would amend twenty-three
existing statutes and enact a new statute on biological and toxin weapons.3
1 Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act,
the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the
registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 (assented to 18 December
2001), S.C. 2001, c. 41 [Anti-Terrorism Act]; Bill C-17, An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to
enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public
safety, 2d Sess., 37th Pan., 2002 (as amended by the Legislative Committee on C-17, 7 May 2003) [Public
SafetyAct]. The current version of the proposed Public SafetyAct replaced the earlier Bill C-55, An Act
to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, 1st Sess., 37th ParI., 2002 (first reading 29 April 2002), in order to enhance public
safety, which, in turn, replaced Bill C-42,An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures
for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety, 1 st Sess.,
37th ParI., 2001 (first reading 22 November 2001), abandoned in the face of criticism. Bill C-44,An Act
to amend the Aeronautics Act, 1st. Sess., 37th Par., 2001 (assented to 18 December 2001), S.C. 2001, c.
38, amending the Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, on instructions from the United States, had
originally been part of the Public Safety Act.
2 Anti-Terrorism Act, ibid., s. 113.
3 Public Safety Act, ibid., s. 106.
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A secondary package includes restrictions on public protest,4 plans for
increased surveillance of private communications,5 monitoring of individual
travel through a 'big brother' database,6 changes in provincial legislation,7
proposals to create a "National Identity Card,"8 and numerous changes in
the law and practice of immigration and citizenship.9 Moreover, much law-
making happens by stealth through virtually invisible changes in delegated
4
In the innocuous sounding Bill C-35, Act to amend the Foreign Missions and International
Organizations Act, Ist Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 (assented to 30 April 2002), S.C. 2002, c. 12, section 5
authorizes a kind of "police exclusion zone." A number of international conferences have revealed the
line between protection from terrorism and improper quelling of political dissent to be indistinct as
police consistently create political cordon sanitaires around such events. See W. W. Pue, "The Prime
Minister's Police? Commissioner Hughes' APEC report" (2001) 39(1) Osgoode Hall L. J. 165; W.
Wesley Pue, ed., Pepper in our eyes: TheAPECAffair (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
2000); Kent Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003)
at 69-70 [September 111. House of Commons Debates, 117 (22 November 2001) at 1130 (Svend
Robinson) online: Canada's Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/
chambus/house/debates/117_2001-11-22/hanl17 ll30-E.htm> (date accessed: 18 May 2003); House
of Commons Debates, 121 (29 November 2001) at 1210 (Francine Lalonde), online: Canada's Parliament
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/l/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/121-2001- 1-29/hanl21 1210-E.htm>
(date accessed: 18 May 2003).
A Department of Justice consultation paper proposes compelling Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) to provide police with the names and addresses of customers, widening police search powers,
requiring ISPs to retain customer web logs for up to six months, and outlawing possession of computer
viruses. Canada, Department of Justice, Lawful Access, (Ottawa: 25 August 2002) online:
<http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/> (date accessed: 17 June 2003). Such proposals
threaten "the fundamental values and fabric of Canadian society" according to the Electronic Frontier
Canada and Electronic Frontier Foundation, Memorandum from Electronic Frontier Canada and
Electronic Frontier Foundation to Lawful Access Consultation (17 December 2002) online: Electronic
Frontier Canada <http://www.efc.ca/pages/surveillance/lawful.doc. cf> (date accessed: 17 June 2003).
See also, Memorandum from British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to Lawful Access
Consultation (16 December 2002) online: <http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/02lawfulaccess.html>
(date accessed: 17 June 2003).
6 Letter from George Radwanski, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, to the Hon. Elinor Caplan,
Minister of National Revenue (26 September 2002) online: Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/02_05_b_020926..e.asp> (date accessed: 17 June 2003). See also,
Letter from Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to the Hon. Elinor
Caplan, Minister of National Revenue (30 September 2002) online: Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/ac_020930_e.asp> (date accessed 17 June 2003).
7 For example, see Security Management Statutes Amendment Act, S.A. 2002, c. 32.
8 See Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, News Release, "A National Identity
Card: Points on which the Committee Invites Comments" online: Canada's Parliament
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/CIMM/PressReleases/CIMMpr5-e.htm> (date accessed: 17
June 2003); Memorandum from British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to the Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration regarding a National ID Card (19 February 2003) online:
<http://www.bccla.org/positions/privacy/03nationalidcard.html > (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
See Bill C-18,An Act respecting Canadian citizenship, 2d Sess., 37th ParI., 2002 (first reading 31
October 2002).
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legislation or state practice,1" precisely at the points where citizen and state
connect most directly."
II. BY WHAT PRINCIPLES SHOULD SECURITY BE
ORGANIZED?
Our traditions and constitutional "morality of aspiration" suggest
that five principles should guide law-making:
1. All law should seek to attain minimal infringement of civil
liberty.
2. There should be maximum clarity of definition regarding
powers conferred, restrictions imposed, and offences
created.
3. All exercise of governmental power should be accountable,
visible, and reviewable by the ordinary courts in the
ordinary ways. The core constitutional principle of
responsible government requires clear and effective
channels of political and legal accountability.
4. Secrecy should only be tolerated in the smallest possible
zone, only as absolutely essential, and only for limited
duration. Power exercised in secret is never accountable.
5. Where extraordinary powers are invoked in times of
perceived crisis, they should be of limited duration,
renewable only by full reconsideration and re-enactment by
Parliament.
10 The Government surreptitiously implemented much of the Anti-Terrorism Act by regulation
while the Act was before Parliament: Canada, United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations,
SOR/2001-360. See also The United States of America v. Liban M. Hussein, [2001] O.J. No. 5812 (QL)
(Factum of the Appellant) online: Edelson & Associates <http://www.edelsonandassociates.com
/articles/Applicant%27s%20Factum.pdf> (date accessed: 27 June 2003).
11 For example, racial profiling practices and non-legislated bilateral agreements. See September
11, supra note 4 at 68-74 (on racial profiling) and the Smart Border Declaration section in Canadian
Bar Association, Report, "In The Shadow Of The Law: A Report by the International Civil Liberties
Monitoring Group (ICLMG) in response to Justice Canada's 1st annual report on the application of
the Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36)" (14 May 2003) online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/news/pdf
/shadow.pdf> (date accessed: 27 June 2003). For additional information, see Reem Bahdi, "No Exit:
Racial Profiling and Canada's War Against Terrorism" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293.
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Such principles provide the motivating spirit of law. They find
expression in legal writings, judicial decisions, parliamentary practice, and
constitutional documents. They are the essence of the Rule of Law, "an
unqualified human good.3
1 2
Canadian anti-terrorism legislation fails on all counts.
This curtailment of constitutional principles would be serious
enough if these were short-term measures. In ordinary wars, temporary state
intrusion is tolerated precisely because hope remains for an eventual return
to constitutional normalcy. The War on Terror, however, is not a real war.
Its parameters are unclear, ranging from gunboat diplomacy to more or less
gratuitous rights violations at home. Linguistic slippage threatens clarity of
thought as the metaphor of war glosses over a great deal. Unlike the war
against the Nazis, unlike even Vietnam, this war involves neither a fixed
enemy nor an identifiable objective. There are no criteria by which to
declare victory or recognize defeat. Closer to the War on Drugs than to
"hot" warfare as such, we find ourselves confronting an endless state of
emergency that ensures the "permanence of the temporary."13 When the
state intrudes on fundamental liberties, "temporary" tends to permanence
as surely as night follows day.
14
III. CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM REGIME: GYPSY MOTHS
AND WORMS
The Anti-Terrorist Act's provisions for preventive detention,15
compelled testimony before "investigative hearings,"" and greatly
12 The description of the rule of law as an "unqualified human good" is drawn from E. P.
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the BlackAct. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) at 266.
David Neal's work The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales remains
an excellent survey of the various understandings of a concept that, at a minimum, stands for the idea
of law holding power accountable (Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Recognition of the
sobering gap between constitutional values and past state practice serves to remind us of the fragility
of liberal democracy, but should never foster an immobilizing cynicism of the sort that would jettison
constitutional aspiration along with naivet6.
13 David Dyzenhaus, "The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers be
Normalized?" in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklein & Kent Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom:
Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 21.
14The Anti-Terrorism Act itself was passed as permanent law. "Sunset" is provided only for those
portions of the Act allowing for preventive arrest and investigative hearings, representing only a tiny
fragment of the whole.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.3.
16 Supra note 15, s. 83.28.
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enhanced powers of government provoked sustained criticism on the
ground that these draconian measures violated Canadian values. A Senate
committee cautioned that "Bill C-36 gives powers that if abused by the
executive or security establishments of this country could have severe
implications for democracy in Canada."17 It is important to recall the
salutary warning, uttered in a slightly different context, that "[i]t is an
outstanding feature of every sedition act that the way it is enforced differs
from the way it looks in print as much as a gypsy moth differs from the
worm from which it has grown.118
Canada's definition of terrorism leaves much room for confusion
of moths and worms. Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines both
"terrorist activity" and "terrorist group." The definition of terrorism is in
two parts, incorporating a number of specific offences set out in various
international conventions or protocols as well as providing a more general
definition. The general definition of terrorism involves an act or omission
motivated in whole or part by a "political, religious or ideological"
purpose 9 with the primary intention ("in whole or in part") of either
intimidating part of the public regarding security or economic security, or
compelling any government, "person," or organization inside or outside
Canada to do or not do "any act." This act must be accompanied by one of
five secondary intentions: causing death or serious bodily harm to a person
by the use of violence, endangering a person's life, causing serious risk to
public health or safety, causing substantial property damage of a sort likely
to result in serious bodily harm, risk to life or public health or safety, or
causing serious interference with any essential "service, facility or system"
other than disruption resulting from advocacy, protest, dissent, or work
stoppage that is not intended to result in harm or threat to life, body,
health, or safety of the public.
Furthermore, the offence of terrorism includes conspiracy, attempt,
threat, counseling, 20 and "accessory after the fact" in relation to the
17Canada, Special Senate Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Report of the
Committee" (1 November 2001) at A(II) online: Canada's Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/l/
parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/sm36-e/rep-e/rep01oct01-e.htm> (date accessed: 29 June 2003).
18 Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1941)
459 cited in L. W. Maher, "The Use and Abuse of Sedition" (1992) 14 Sydney L. Rev. 287 at 287.
19 Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A).
20 "Counsel," under the Criminal Code, s. 22(3) includes procuring, soliciting or inciting (supra
note 15). According to the Canadian Encyclopaedic Digest (Ontario) 3d ed., vol. 7A (Toronto: Carswell,
1996) at s. 729, "in order to qualify as 'counselling', the acts or words of the accused must be likely to
push or incite, and be done or said with a view towards pushing or inciting, another to commit an
offence."
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designated acts or omissions. 2' At first glance, this appears complicated.
More careful investigation reveals it to be nonsensical.
Take, for example, the protection of even unlawful "advocacy,"
"protest," "dissent," and "work stoppage." This protection sits uneasily with
the inclusion of "political, religious or ideological" 22 motivation in the
definition of terrorism because advocacy, protest, dissent, and work
stoppage are typically motivated in whole or in part by political, religious,
or ideological commitment. The "saving" directly contradicts the
"motivation" element.
Even the seemingly simple question of determining whether
someone has the "intent" to threaten life, body, health, safety, or essential
services is left unclear. If such an objective must be the sole objective or
purpose in order to meet the intention required then only the most
bloodthirsty of killers would be a terrorist. When the Front de Libdration du
Quibec sought to destroy symbols of the Canadian state by placing bombs
in mailboxes, they did not necessarily seek to kill postal workers. If,
however, recklessness as to a mere possibility suffices, the terrorist net is
cast very wide. All large demonstrations interfere with essential services by
disrupting traffic flow. In such circumstances, it is entirely foreseeable that
members of the public may suffer if fire fighters, ambulances, or police
services are unable to do their work. If the intent required to be a terrorist
is only some knowledge that some threat to safety might develop as one
possible outcome of one's actions, many demonstrators would become
terrorists despite the "saving" clause.
The Government of Canada has offered assurances that we need
not fear such possibilities, explaining that
... [P]rotest activity that intentionally causes serious disruption of essential services or
infrastructure, even if it is unlawful, would not be characterized as a terrorist activity unless
it also intentionally causes death or serious harm to people.... Terrorist activity would not
include acts of civil disobedience or labour actions, even if they were unlawful, such as acts
that resulted in some property damage.'
This assurance is disingenuous. A person cannot "intend" to
seriously disrupt essential services without also "intending" to some extent
the obvious natural consequence that members of the public who depend
on those services might be seriously hurt. One hopes that the courts will
21 Supra note 15, s. 83.01(b).
22 Ibid., s. 83.01(b)(i)(A).
23Department of Justice, Backgrounder, "Amendments to theAnti-TerrorismAct" (20 November
2001) online: <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27904.html> (date accessed: 29 June
2003).
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find that there is a protected place of political dissent, but it is not created
in the words of this appallingly drafted statute.
Just as the boundary between dissent and terrorism is unclear, so
too the legislation confuses more or less ordinarily thuggish, violent
behaviour with terrorism. As John Russell notes, violent protesters, eco-
terrorists who spike trees with the intent of injuring loggers, and animal
rights activists who poison Christmas turkeys all fall within the statutory
definition of terrorists. They threaten "serious bodily harm in order to
achieve political objectives." Violent individuals deserve little sympathy, but
counting them as "terrorists"
... needlessly multiplies the number of terrorists on the ground in Canada. Among other
things, this would distract from our efforts to detect and bring to justice the real terrorists.
It will inevitably place the activities of legitimate protest groups under extraordinary, close
government scrutiny. This is bound to have a chilling effect on those groups' activities and
raise questions about the legitimacy of the campaign against terror.2
4
Here too we can see worms becoming confused with gypsy moths.
The statute threatens to "chill" the activities of entirely legitimate protest
groups 2 that are accepted as more or less natural parts of our political and
cultural landscape and whose activities-however inconvenient-we cherish
as the mark of our liberty. A section intended to alleviate concern about
such matters does not help.
For greater certainty, the expression of a political, religious, or
ideological thought, belief, or opinion does not come within paragraph (b)
of the definition "terrorist activity" in subsection (1) unless it constitutes an
act or omission that satisfies the criteria of that paragraph.' This
transparently useless addition does nothing to atone for the pervasively
poor drafting of the Act.
IV. EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL REACH
Poor drafting or conceptual incoherence apart, relatively few
problems would arise if terrorism were defined simply as the use of violence
or threat of violence in an attempt to coerce the Canadian government.
24 British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, News Release, "Distinguishing Terrorism from
Other Types of Political Violence" (29 November 2001) online:
<http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/Olterrordefbroad.html> (date accessed: 29 June 2003).
25 This has certainly been the pattern in the past. See, for example, Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: the
RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002).
26 Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1.1).
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Similarly, long-standing Canadian allies such as the countries of the
European Community or the United States, for example, might be
presumed to enjoy a degree of legitimacy that precludes Canadian approval
of the use of deadly force against them. A definition of terrorism that
specifically prohibited the use of violence to coerce named countries or
their citizens would be both clear and defensible.
The new terrorism offences are not so defined, purporting instead
to prohibit all acts or omissions committed "in or outside Canada" with the
intent of "compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an
international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act .... "27 In
the result, "counseling" someone to do (or not do) something that
threatens the "economic security" of someone so as to compel "a
government" is a terrorist offence. The only further required element is
that there be some risk to health or safety to a portion of the public outside
Canada. It would be no defence to show that the particular government
really is reprehensible or that it ought to be compelled, intimidated, or
overthrown for the benefit of either its own citizens or others who might fall
victim to its power. Though some have argued that Canadians should "not
be barred from subsidizing the use of force against dictatorships in other
countries,"' the statute allows for no distinction between liberation armies
and terrorists. On its face, it accords the most brutal of dictatorships the
same "anti-terrorist" protection as Canada itself.
Matters become more complicated still when we recognize that
Canada is not a pacifist country. Thus, use of arms in accordance with
international law is excluded from the definition of terrorism.29
Confusingly, however, a good deal of armed conflict and some state military
activity takes place in ways that are not condoned by international law, and
this includes acts of violence approved by Canada or its allies.30 Canada
rarely objects when our closest allies foment armed resistance (terrorism)
in other places. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, however, Canadians who
2 7 Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1)(b). Other provisions "deem" specified acts or omissions committed
outside of the country to have been committed in Canada if either the act of terrorism is directed in
some way against Canada, or if the perpetrator fits certain criteria of connection to Canada.
28 Canadian Civil Liberties Association, News Release, "Does the Anti-Terror Bill Go Too Far?"
(December 2001) online: <http:/www.ccla.org/news/01-12_anti-terror.shtml > (date accessed: 29 June
2003).
29 Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1)(b).
3 0 The status of the U.S.-led attack on Iraq under international law is unclear. See Ikechi Mgbeoji,
"Prophylactic Use of Force in International Law: The Illegitimacy of Canada's Participation in
'Coalitions of the Willing' Without UN Authorization and Parliamentary Sanction" (2003) 8(2) Rev.
Const. Stud. [forthcoming] and Thomas Walkom, "Attack on Iraq could turn Bush into criminal" The
Toronto Star (18 March 2003) A25 (quoting legal expert Ted McWhinney).
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supported dissidents within Iraq prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, for
example, would have been acting in contravention of our anti-terrorism
laws, even if they did so by aiding U.S. officials. It is inconceivable, of
course, that Canadian foreign policy would wish such a result.31
Because it fails to address such real world complexities, a
fundamental dishonesty underlies theAnti- TerrorismAct. The law can never
mean what it seems to say. We cannot indefinitely avoid distinguishing
terrorists from freedom fighters and, having failed to do so explicitly in the
legislation, the same result must be achieved surreptitiously. A modern-day
Norman Bethune, the Canadian hero of the Spanish Civil War and of the
Chinese Revolution, appears through one lens as a great humanitarian,
through another as a terrorist. He is in good company, as Member of
Parliament Lorne Nystrom pointed out:
... [T]he British considered Menachem Begin to be a terrorist. He was a freedom fighter to
many of the Israeli people. Nelson Mandela ... a tremendous freedom fighter in my opinion,
was considered by some people ... to be a terrorist.... The American revolution was an act
of terrorism for some; an act of freedom and liberation for others. 32
Canada's one-size-fits-all definition of terrorist embraces anti-
Castro activists in Cuba (or Florida), Kurdish resistance to Saddam
Hussein, "groups fighting for democracy in Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Chile," Louis Riel, Mahatma Gandhi, the Intifada, and
George Washington.33
31The parallel universe of refugee and immigration law illustrates the real world complexities in
this area. Although Israel is a country with which Canada has long-standing cordial relations, the
Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, on the urging of a
Federal Government lawyer, ruled in W.D.U. (Re) [2002], R.P.D.D. No. 167 No. MAl-01203 (IRB) at
para. 35, that a man who had worked for Israel's secret intelligence agency was ineligible for refugee
status because of being complicit "in crimes against humanity committed by Israel." Conversely, in
Fuentes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [20031 FCT 379 at para. 47, Lemieux J. held
that Rogelio Cuevas Fuentes was potentially eligible for refugee status, despite past violence against
the Mexican government undertaken as a "guerilla" rather than as a "terrorist."
32 House of Commons Debates, 058 (12 February 2003) at 1550 (Hon. Lorne Nystrom) online:
Canada's Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/058_2003-02-
12/han058_1550-E.htm > (date accessed: 29 June 2003). Compare with Anne McIlroy, "Citizen bane"
The Guardian (11 June 2001) online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/
journalist/story/0,7792,505086,00.html> (date accessed: 29 June 2003) (reporting Member of
Parliament Rob Anders' objections to honouring Mandela because of his terrorist past).
Compare with September 11, supra note 4 at 58-62.
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V. TERRORIST GROUPS
One poorly drafted definition piles atop others as definitions of
"terrorist groups" are constructed on top of the definitions of terrorism. A
"terrorist group" is an entity whose purposes or activities include carrying
out or facilitating any terrorist activity or an entity "listed" by the Governor
in Council on the advice of the Solicitor General.3 ' Because the definition
of a terrorist activity is imprecise, so too is the definition of a terrorist
group. One definition is built upon the other.
The category of "terrorist group" is larger than it otherwise might
be because of the inclusion of groups whose purpose, in part, is to facilitate,
contribute to, or participate ("directly or indirectly") in a "terrorist" activity
or a "terrorist group." "Facilitating," "participating in," or "contributing to"
are, in turn, surprisingly broad concepts.35 Under section 83.18(1) of the
Criminal Code, "Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to,
directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of
enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a
terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence ...."
This offence may be committed even where no terrorist activity is
actually facilitated or carried out. It is irrelevant that the individual's
contribution or participation may not have actually enhanced the ability of
the group in any way and, indeed, irrelevant that the accused may not have
known of the specific nature of any terrorist activity the group may have
been involved in. Participation or contribution may involve as little as
"offering to provide a skill or an expertise," "remaining in any country ... in
association with a terrorist group," or making oneself available to facilitate
a terrorist offence. Evidence of involvement in terrorist groups can be
found in association with persons involved in a terrorist group, receipt of
"any benefit" from such persons, repeated engagement "in activities at the
instruction of" members of a terrorist group, or use of "a name, word,
symbol or other representation. 3 6 Facilitation of a terrorist activity is
prohibited by section 83.19 of the Criminal Code:
83.19 (1) Every one who knowingly facilitates a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
(2) For the purposes of this Part, a terrorist activity is facilitated whether or not
34 Supra note 15, ss. 83.01, 83.05.
35 Ibid., s. 83.01(1.1) specifies that facilitation is to be construed in accordance with s.83.19(2).
3 6 Ibid., s. 83.18(2)(3)(4).
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(a) the facilitator knows that a particular terrorist activity is facilitated;
(b) any particular terrorist activity was foreseen or planned at the time it was
facilitated; or
(c) any terrorist activity was actually carried out.
Bizarrely, knowing facilitation can happen even though no terrorist
activity was in fact carried out, where the "facilitator" does not know "that
a particular activity is facilitated," and where no particular terrorist activity
was foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated." This is grammatical,
if not legal, nonsense inasmuch as there is no "it" capable of being
"knowingly" facilitated if nothing is foreseen or planned. Nonsense or not,
a very real fourteen-year sentence of imprisonment attaches to the
offence."8
VI. THE HOUSE OF MIRRORS: AL QAEDA, ROTARIANS,
AND CHRISTIAN AID
Like images in a House of Mirrors, "terrorists" appear in a series
of reflections, each more distant than the one before. One section reflects
another, continuing in infinite regression.
Imagine, for example, the precarious situation of a guest speaker
from a human rights non-governmental organization (NGO) who
encourages Rotarians to divest from "Mortland," in the expectation that
the resulting economic hardship will force that country's repressive
government to abandon long-standing human rights violations. Her
organization might also support church groups providing humanitarian aid
to rural villagers who, in turn, might sometimes support anti-government
guerillas. Promotion of a "boycott" or "divestment" campaign amounts to
"counselling" an act (divestment) for political purposes in the hope of
disrupting "economic security" so as to compel "a government" to change
its conduct. Such campaigns endanger health or safety and disrupt essential
services in direct proportion to their success. The church group too is
involved in activities that in part support terrorist activity. Canadian law
3 7 1bid., s. 83.19(2).
38 The Department of Justice's Fact Sheet, "Strengthening the Safeguards With Amendments to
the Proposed Anti-Terrorism Act" (20 November 2001) online:
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27906.htmi> (date accessed: 30 June 2003) [emphasis
in original], papered over the difficulties: "The provisions concerning facilitation of a terrorist activity
... clearly state that, in order to be guilty of an offence, an individual must know or intend that his or
her act would help a terrorist activity to occur, even if the details of the activity are not known by the
individual." The Act lacks the clarity of the explanation.
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forgives neither the church group nor the human rights organization simply
because they disavow armed struggle. Both are tainted by "terrorist"
activity. As image after image is reflected, the Rotary Club itself is caught
because it facilitated the presentation. Participation in Rotary in turn
becomes a crime. Terrorists, all.
This scenario, of course, is nonsense, reductio ad absurdum at its
worst. It is hard to imagine Rotarians being prosecuted in such
circumstances. If commenced, the prosecution could never succeed. It feels
wrong. Though the question of where the police or the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (csIs) will cast their net of surveillance is a different
matter, one suspects that even here the Rotary Club at least might fare
reasonably well. Somewhere on the slippery slope between Al Qaeda and
Rotary there is an invisible line.
That such concerns are not entirely academic is shown by the
response of a number of Canadian "civil society" groups representing
Aboriginal groups, labour organizations, and ethnic communities, amongst
others, who expressed their concerns during hearings on theAnti- Terrorism
Act. Most feared the criminalization of entirely legitimate activities, and the
exposure of their members to improper surveillance, questioning,
harassment, or criminal charges.39 The Evangelical Fellowship of Canada's
(EFC) brief to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
provides a telling example. This umbrella group of "32 evangelical,
Protestant denominations and over 100 Christian organizations" includes
"churches and relief and development organizations that are involved in
religious and humanitarian work around the world."4 The EFC feared that
the Bill could "put a chill on Canadian charities providing assistance where
it is most needed, in conflict-ridden situations." '41
Resources are one issue. The distinction between "good guys" and
"bad guys" is not always clear, and charities lack the intelligence capabilities
required to ensure that none of their "resources would assist someone who
could be considered an insurgent or terrorist." Consequently, the EFC
worried about a number of matters: "Would providing humanitarian
assistance to communities that contain or are associated with terrorists be
caught within the scope of the legislation?" Might a Canadian charity
providing "financing or resources to a group ... [subsequently] determined
39 September 11, supra note 4 at 58-64.
40 Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, "Submission to the Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights on Bill C-36, An Act in Order to Combat Terrorism" (8 November 2001) online:
<http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/pdf/Anti-Terrorism%20Bill%20C-36.pdf> (date accessed: 30
June 2003) at 1.
41 Ibid. at 2.
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[by Government] to be a 'terrorist group'... face sanctions even though the
entity was not considered a 'terrorist group' at the time"?
42
Noting that foreign governments often dislike Christian charities
and human rights groups, the EFC feared "false or misleading evidence"
being provided secretly and used against it in Canada. The result would
make the Canadian state the agent of "foreign governments" in pursuit of
"religious, political and ideological purposes against Canadian people or
organizations .... "
Although such situations could arise innocently, in the ordinary
sense of that word, there have also been times when evangelical groups
have deliberately provided aid knowing full well that doing so facilitated
terrorism.
1) In the 1980s there was a UNHCR refugee camp in Thailand and on the border of
Cambodia, the home of some 30,000 Khmer Rouge refugees. Some of the men from the
refugee camp would, from time to time, clandestinely conduct raids into Cambodia. Two
organizations, one religious the other not, were contracted to provide medical aid and food
to the refugees.
2) Another Christian organization provides medical and dental care ... in a region controlled
by outlawed militia groups. The clinics function with the permission of the militia who may
from time to time avail themselves of medical and dental services offered to anyone who asks
for assistance."
In short, EFC-affiliated organizations have deliberately aided terrorists in the
past.
It is apparent that the boundaries between humanitarian and
terrorist activity are imprecise. We can presume that evangelicals do not
generally support terrorism. It is their humanitarian urges that are the
problem. Their example also serves to illustrate the dangers inherent in
defining offences by reference to political, religious, or ideological
motivations for the EFC explicitly acknowledges its colourable motivations:
"Christians have Biblical instruction to love and care for their enemies, not
just their friends (Matt. 5:44). This means that humanitarian assistance can
be provided to those engaged in military conflict, terrorism or gross human
rights violations."45
42 1bid. at3.
Ibid at 4.
4 4 bid at 1.
4 Supa note 40 at 1. In "Matthew 5:44:: 21' Century King James Verson (KJ21)," online: BibleGateway.com
<htt/wwegawayom-b elanguae=engi msa =Matthew+5%3A44&eraon=KJ21 > (date
accesd: 31 July 2003), the Bible says to"... Low your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate
you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you."
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In short, EFC-affiliated organizations fully intend to aid terrorists in
the future. They will do so because God orders it. Their religious
motivation, rendered suspect under the Criminal Code, is a constitutionally
protected value. But if freedom of religion might justify providing
humanitarian aid to "our enemies," so too the freedom of conscience for
those who aid evildoers only because of secular humanitarian motivations
must be respected.
VII. UMPIRE'S DISCRETION
The obvious objection to these concerns is that they are based on
a statutory reading insufficiently leavened by pragmatism, that they rest too
much on a literal, overly-legalistic approach to the statute. This is a valid
objection.
Despite the plausibility of the argument presented by the EFC in its
brief, neither it nor its affiliated organizations are likely to suffer penal
consequence under these laws. It seems highly unlikely that any Canadian
security official or Attorney General would wish to prosecute evangelicals
for engaging in "good works." cSIs will not wish to spy on them. Ministers
will not wish to "list" them; financial institutions will not report their
activities to the authorities; their assets will not be frozen, their members
will not be imprisoned. If this intuition is correct, groups such as the
Apostolic Church of the Pentecost and the Foursquare Gospel Church have
little to fear from the anti-terrorism laws. Various evangelical educational
organizations and associated charities, including the likes of Arab World
Ministries, Focus on the Family, and World Vision would also be "safe."
Such organizations will not be treated as terrorists despite the EFC's
admission that its member organizations have aided terrorists in the past,
and its declared intent to do so in the future.
But the fact that we are confident that certain groups would not be
considered to be terrorist, should not reassure us.
No invisible "bubble zone" protects other kinds of religious or
charitable groups. On the contrary, some are rendered suspect simply
because of who they are. Muslim, Sikh, or Hindu organizations cannot
assume equal status before the law with evangelical groups. The reductio ad
absurdum presented earlier makes this clear. Disconcertingly, we leave the
realm of the absurd with astonishing ease if "Mortland" becomes Israel,
"rural Mortland" becomes the occupied territories, "church groups"
become Islamic organizations, and the human rights group is tied to either
the anti-globalization or decolonization movements.
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The difference is not legal, but sociological and political. The
terrorist offences are defined so broadly as to encompass almost everyone
and they are given meaning only in application. But in such a case, law has
given way to expediency. The invitation to read a statute pragmatically
amounts to an invitation to place unquestioning trust in the discretion (a
polite term denoting biases, gut instincts, upbringing, and socialization) of
officialdom. This approach is an affront both to the very idea of public
governance by law and to the underpinnings of liberal democracy. It will be
police and bureaucrats, not Supreme Court justices, who will give these
laws concrete meaning.46 The collateral damage done by misdirected anti-
terrorist fire will register as irreparable harm to innocent people.
Disturbingly, all of Canada's anti-terrorism law turns on official
discretion. Despite many complex definitions, qualifications, subordinate
clauses, nuance, and subtle layering, the Anti- Terrorism Act comes down to
the conferral of massive, ill-defined powers on police officers and the
executive branch of government. Prohibitions on dealing with terrorist
assets can be waived by "the Solicitor General of Canada" or his or her
designate,47 while investigative hearings and preventive arrest require the
"consent of the Attorney General., 4 Similarly, prosecutions under the
Security of Information Act require the consent of the federal Attorney
General,49 while the Solicitor General (in concert with the Minister of
National Revenue) may issue "certificates" effectively stripping
organizations of their charitable status.50 Capping it all, terrorist entities are
so designated by the Governor in Council,5" while "[p]roceedings in respect
of a terrorism offence or an offence under section 83.12" require the
consent of the Attorney General.52
46 Letter from John Dixon, President, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to Rt. Hon.
Jean Chretien, Prime Minister of Canada, (22 November 2001) online:
<http://www.bccla.org/othercontent101c36openletter.html> (date accessed: 30 June 2003).
47 Supra note 15, s. 83.09.
48 bid, ss. 83.28, 83.3.
49 Security of Information Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 0-5, s. 24.
50 Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, s. 4 being Part 6, s. 113 of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41.
51 Supra note 15, s. 83.05
5 2 Ibid., s. 83.24. Section 83.12 deals with the freezing of terrorist group property. Under section
2, a "terrorism offence" is defined as an offence under any of sections 83.02 (financing terrorism), 83.04
(using or possessing property for terrorist purposes), or 83.18-23 (participating, facilitating, instructing,
or harbouring terrorist groups; facilitating terrorist activity; committing an indictable offence for or with
a terrorist group; instructing someone to carry out an activity for a terrorist group, or to carry out a
terrorist activity; harbouring, or concealing a person in relation to terrorism).
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The head of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the
federal Solicitor General, and the Attorney General of Canada have each
acknowledged that the Act turns on official discretion. Asked by Senator
Karen Fraser to explain the "reasonable grounds" that might justify the use
of preventive detention, RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli responded:
Obviously, what you have just described is a lower threshold than what we are normally
used to seeing in this country. ... We are in active discussions about what this means because
the devil is in the detai as we know. It is easy to rea4 but it is how we apply and how we interpret
this which will determine how this really works.
We are in active discussions with our lawyers and with lawyers from the Department of
Justice to determine what this means.... [You] take [our] best information and [our] best
intelligence and make that determination. That is how our system works. It puts into the
hands of the police officer the authority to exercise that, but it has to be exercised on solid
basis. 3
The Act, in other words, provides no useful guidance whatsoever.
The RCMP Commissioner's response amounts to an astonishing admission
of the extent to which citizens' rights rest on official discretion.
Moreover, the Solicitor General made a similar admission
regarding the "listing" of terrorist entities:
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Reading the definition of terrorist activity, it certainly goes way
beyond some of the activities, in particular the one climaxing on September 11. It can also
be applied to strictly domestic activities.
What I am trying to get from you, minister, is how far in Canadian society does the net
of the definition of terrorist activity extend? Right now, this proposed legislation is the result
of a terrible event. However, the way it is written and drafted it goes way beyond those who
cause that event or their sympathizers, to my mind. I should like to know whether you share
that view or not.
Mr. MacAulay: Senator, I would like to say that in this situation it is not who you are, it is
what you have done. If you have done something in order that in my evaluation you should
be listed as a terrorist organization or individual, then an Order in Council approves that
recommendation from me and then they are listed. s
53 Canada, Senate, The Special Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Issue 2-Evidence
(afternoon sitting)" (23 October 2001) online: Canada's Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca
/37/l/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/sm36-e/02evb-e.htm?Language=E&Par =37&Ses= l&comm
id=90> (date accessed: 30 June 2003) [emphasis added].
54 Canada, Senate, The Special Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Issue 1-Evidence
(afternoon sitting)" (22 October 2001) online: Canada's Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/l/
parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/sm36-e/Olevc-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses= l&comm id=90>
(date accessed: 30 June 2003) [emphasis added].
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Curiously, the Minister's response when questioned about the
legislation's indeterminate language was that he would decide its meaning:
discretion substitutes for law. This admission might be dismissed as a
minister's misstatement were it not for the fact that Attorney General Anne
McLellan sang the same song in scolding The Globe and Mail for saying the
Anti-Terrorism bill would "strip Canadians of civil liberties." Proudly,
albeit illogically, she pointed to the requirement for "the consent of the
Attorney General" before unpleasant things could happen.55
Such statements are not very reassuring. The Rule of Law requires
clarity in penal prohibitions for, without clarity, the rights of anyone to go
about business unhindered by the state rests entirely on the discretion of
police officers, prosecutors, bureaucrats, and politicians. Vague statutory
language is rendered concrete only in police action backstopped by
ministerial case-to-case political judgment. "The devil," as the RCMP
Commissioner said, "is in the detail." The only decisions that matter will be
made behind closed doors, without announced standards (this the Solicitor
General made clear), secretly, politically, and without realistic possibility
of either judicial review or public accountability.
We should not, however, confer powers on individuals because we
trust them. This is not because we have reason to distrust the particular
individuals who hold office, but because experience shows that power
corrupts and absolute power (the kind "trust" seeks) corrupts absolutely.
When a sort of "umpire's discretion" takes the place of rules, the Rule of
Law is lost entirely.56 Any statutory scheme constructed on such principles
should fail judicial review as both overbroad and unconstitutionally vague.57
Neither Parliament nor the court can ameliorate the effects of bad
legislation once it is on the books. Parliament is a paper tiger 58 while
judicial review comes too rarely, too little, too late, and in contexts in which
habits of judicial deference to executive power are strongly ingrained.
5 5 Anne McLellan, Minister of Justice "Antiterrorism act" The Globe andMail (25 October 2001)
A18. See also the testimony of Justice Minister Anne McLellan with respect to the Attorney General's
discretion regarding preventive arrest and investigative hearings, Canada, Senate, The Special
Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Issue 1 -Evidence (morning sitting)" (22 October 2001)
online: Canada's Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parIbus/commbus/senate/
Com-e/sm36-e/Olevb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses= l&commid =90> (date accessed: 30 June
2003).
56 See: Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
5 7 See: Marc Ribeiro, LimitingArbitrary Power: The Vagueness Principle in Canadian Constitutional
Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004) [forthcoming in 2004].
58 The Canadian system of government is notoriously closely directed by the Prime Minister:
Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: the Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999).
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Courtroom victory in any event is pyrrhic because it cannot "put together
ruined families, regain lost livelihoods, or rebuild friendship and trust,
which were fractured by the suspicion, innuendo and stigmatization sown
by the overly zealous acts of the State." 59
VIII. THE PUBLIC SAFETYACT
Although strongly praised by a leading expert on anti-terrorism law,
the Public Safety Act, too is fundamentally flawed. Kent Roach praises the
Bill for offering practical responses to the threat of terrorism. It seeks to
establish a "multi-department approach to regulating materials that can be
used for terrorism and sites that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks...."60
Roach believes that, unlike theAnti-TerrorismAct, such measures are likely
to reduce opportunities for terrorism while "providing less of a threat to
liberty, privacy, and equality than the criminal law. 61
This depiction is too sanguine. The Bill operates by giving ministers
huge, unchecked, powers. Discretion and secret decisions permeate the
entire legislation. Parliament is shunted aside as "[i]nterim orders,
emergency measures and security measures across a wide area of federal
jurisdiction are to be implemented on Ministerial discretion, largely without
review and largely without consultation. Most of these measures can be
delegated to officials ... further reducing accountability for what is being
done." 62 Such a scheme weakens the chain of shared cabinet responsibility,
which is a cornerstone of responsible government. The Globe and Mail's
assessment of the Act's first incarnation remains accurate:
The government refers to its proposed Public Safety Act as legislation, but it might as easily
call it a blank cheque. Whenever their inspiration flags, the authors leave it to individual
ministers to do whatever they feel is necessary whenever they feel they must. ... [T]he bill
reads as though someone had peppered the draft text with Post-It notes: Insert greater
ministerial powers here.
63
59 Muslim Lawyer's Association, "Statement of the Coalition of Muslim Organizations on Bill C-
36 (Anti-Terrorism Act)" (Remarks to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 8
November 2001) cited in September 11, supra note 4 at 63.
60 Ibid. at 176.
61 Ibid.
62 British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, News Release, " Written Submissions To The
House Of Commons Legislative Committee On Bill C-17" (30 January 2003) online:
<http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/03publicsafety.html> (date accessed: 30 June 2003)
(Recommendation #2).
63,"The Public Safety Act seeks too much power..." Editorial, The Globe and Mail (24 November
2001) A24.
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Despite laudable objectives, the approach of the Public Safety Act is
profoundly misguided.'
IX. ARE OFFENSIVE MEASURES JUSTIFIABLE?
It is obvious that the legislative response to 9/11 has the potential
to profoundly encroach upon civil liberties. Despite this, it is possible to
support this legislation. People who do so claim that no harm will be done
to the innocent, that extraordinary measures are called for in extraordinary
times, or that overweening police powers are acceptable because they are
lesser than the evil of terrorism.
During debate on the Anti-Terrorism Act, the concept of "human
security" was massaged first into a human right and then into a political
trump card. Liberal Member of Parliament Irwin Cotler described
Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act as
... human security legislation, which seeks to protect both national security ... and civil
liberties. As the United Nations puts it, terrorism constitutes a fundamental assault on
human rights ... while counter-terrorism law involves a protection of the most fundamental
of rights, the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person, as well as the collective right
of peace.'
So viewed, "security" could be "balanced" in the mix of other human rights.
But security always wins.
Though security from bombers and hijackers is certainly a good
thing, it is curious to treat domestic spies, privacy invasion, and the
unilateral exercise of state power as human rights measures. No responsible
person suggests that terrorist acts are to be tolerated, and the relevant
points of contention concern only the best means by which to ensure
security consistently with the overriding goal of preserving liberal
democracy. The "human security" rationale, bandied about loosely, served
to cut off discussion at precisely the point where reflection was most
necessary.
In Canadian political discourse, seemingly offensive measures are
rendered more widely acceptable than might otherwise be the case if they
are credibly said to be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
64 See also Canadian Bar Association, "Submission on Bill C-17: Public SafetyAcq 2002" (January
2003) online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/pdf/c%2D17%2Deng.pdf> (date accessed: 30 June 2003).
65 Irwin Cotler, "Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law
and Policy" insupra note 13, 111 at 112-13.
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Freedoms. 6 During debate on the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Charter was used
effectively, though misleadingly, as a pivot point for ministerial media spin.
"Charter-proofing," however, is a minimal attainment.67 It confuses one
piece of evidence regarding fundamental constitutional principles (the
Charter) for the whole 8 and mistakes formal constitutional compliance with
legislative wisdom. To predict a bill will survive Charter scrutiny implies
nothing about the ways police officers will use it, nothing about the
effectiveness of the bill in relation to its desired ends, and little about its
consonance with larger principles of constitutionalism. Focus on "Charter-
proofing" is a shell game which keeps public attention well away from "the
action. ,
69
A more honest defence for apparently draconian laws is found in
the assumptions that innocent people have nothing to fear, that only
criminals seek privacy, that such legislation does not hurt anyone, and that
the authorities can be trusted. A peculiar Canadian twist on this theme,
uttered sotto voce, is the assumption that Canadian authorities are less
inclined to overreaction, gross violations of human rights, and racially
discriminatory law enforcement than their U.S. counterparts. This too is
unhelpful and, ultimately, highly misleading. There is little cause for
smugness on the grounds that others behave worse than we do. Moreover,
to say that laws- have not in fact been abused says nothing about their
potential for misuse. It amounts only to a restatement of the "trust me"
rationale. Acts conferring unprecedented powers lurk dangerously. Like
hidden mines, they are set to explode whenever wrong-headed individuals
exercise power. Bad laws can be used against us "in 10, 20 or even 50 years
66 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11.
[Charter].
67 Compare with Philip Thomas, "September 11 th and Good Governance" (2002) 53 N. Ir. Legal
Q. 366 ["Good Governance"], and Kent Roach, "The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based
Response to Terrorism" in The Security of Freedom, supra note 13, 131; September 11, supra note 4.
68 In a particularly cynical move, the preamble to Canada, Bill C-36,AnActto amend the Criminal
Code, the Official Secrets Act the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act
and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism,
1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001, Preamble (assented to 18 December 2001) online: Canada's Parliament
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/l/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-36/C-36-3/90168bE.html>
(date accessed: 30 June 2003) stated that Canada "is committed to taking comprehensive measures
against terrorist activity while continuing to respect and promote the values reflected in ... the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Unlike the EmergenciesAct, R.S.C. 1985 (4b Supp.), c. 22, there is no
mention of the Canadian Bill of Rights (the Anti-Terrorism Act operates through massive interference
with property rights, which are protected under the Bill of Rights but not the Charter).
69 September 11, supra note 4 at 99.
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time ... by an unscrupulous government."7 They also inevitably establish
a new baseline from which increasingly draconian legislation will be
launched when the next terrible event occurs.71 And terrible events are
inevitable.
In any event, it is not true that "no harm" has been done. In one
case, a Canadian businessman was "listed" as a "terrorist entity" and
arrested in the autumn of 2001. Liban Hussein's assets were frozen, and he
was subjected to extradition proceedings. Though it was subsequently
admitted that there was no evidence linking him to terrorism, Hussein was
ruined, losing "his business, his income, his job, and his prospects." In
another, CsIs "facilitated the transfer" of a Canadian citizen, Mansour
Jabarah, to the United States,72 and in still another, the home of an animal
rights activist was raided on the theory that his activities amounted to
terrorism.73 More broadly, privacy experts warn that the War on Terror
threatens a fundamental transformation of state-citizen relations in
Canada. A report on the first year of the Anti- Terrorist Act found "a serious
erosion of civil rights, especially with regards to due process and the right
to privacy."74 The inventory of abusive state action includes criminalization
of political dissent,75 racial profiling,76 unnecessarily harsh treatment of
70 George Williams, "Australian Values and the War Against Terrorism" (National Press Club
Telstra Australia Day Address, 29 January 2003) online: University of New South Wales Faculty of Law
<http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/events/AustraliaDayAddress-Terrorism.html> (date accessed: 23 June
2003).
71 Timothy Lynch, "Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Preserving Our Liberties While Fighting
Terrorism" (2002) 443 Pol'y Analysis online: CATO Institute <http://www.cato.org/pubs/
pas/pa443.pdf> (date accessed: 30 June 2003); "Good Governance," supra note 67.
72 Alan Borovoy "Security's Serpentine Coils" The Globe and Mail (1 August 2002) A21.
Thomas Walkom "War on terror being used as fig leaf" The Toronto Star (20 August 2001) A19.
See Canadian Bar Association, supra note 11, 3; Canadian Bar Association, News Release,
"CBA Calls Federal Government First Anniversary Report onAnti-TerrorismAct Inadequate" (14 May
2003) online: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/2003_Releases/PrintHtml.asp?Docld=52473> (date
accessed: 30 June 2003).
Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 6-7. Examples included a raid on Native activists at Port
Alberni, British Columbia; an article in the RCMP Gazette, identifying environmental activists, amongst
others, as potential terrorists; a CSIS report identifying the anti-globalization movement as a threat to
security; and the seizure of U.S. anti-war videotapes by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
76 Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 7-9. Issues noted included police failures to respond to hate
crimes against Muslims; "hundreds" of cases where Arab and/or Muslim community leaders were
threated with "preventive detention" if they failed to provide "voluntary" interviews; Canada's failure
to protest "the disappearance, secret detention and deportation by American authorities of Maher Arar
and a half dozen other Canadian citizens of Arab or Islamic origin"; CSiS harassment of Arab university
students including threats of "deportation and revocation of their citizenship if they did not provide
information about community members"; the failure of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
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refugees,7 7 a chilling of humanitarian work, 78 and violations of privacy
rights.79
Even in light of all this, however, it remains possible that there may
be no alternative. Canada must join with other countries in the struggle
against terrorism. Unfortunately, there is little reason for confidence that
the measures taken to date will be effective in relation to the ends sought.
The success of the 9/11 attackers resulted more from failure of intelligence
capacity than inadequacy in law.8" Canada's law-based response through
"the Anti-Terrorism Act largely made criminal, conduct that was already
criminal before September 11, and most of its new investigative powers and
offences were not even used during the first year of the law's existence.
81
Disturbingly too, the new legislation reveals little concern to balance strong
powers with civil rights protections despite the model provided in the
Emergencies Act, for example.82
Worse, while there have been violations of essential liberties there
has been no obvious gain in security. Complete safety from terrorists is
International Trade to warn Arab or Muslim Canadians against travel to the United States (where
serious rights violations are commonly suffered by members of this community); the Deputy Minister
of Justice, Morris Rosenberg's, refusal to disavow racial profiling.
77 Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 9-10. Refugee claimants are now routinely detained upon
arrival at Pearson International Airport; those appearing at the Canada-U.S. border are turned back
even in circumstances where there is no guarantee they will be permitted to return for assessment of
their refugee claim.
78 Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 10-11. NGOs are increasingly concerned that humanitarian
assistance is compromised in areas of conflict where it may be "impossible to avoid relating to all
involved combatants..."; "southern partners" find it increasingly difficult to obtain visas needed to
attend meetings in Canada; "programs in countries such as Lebanon or Colombia ... could be
jeopardized by fear of potential 'proximity' with 'listed entities,' like Hezbollah or [the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Columbia]"; "One mainstream church-based NGO reported ... that its financial
institution refused on two occasions to transfer funds earmarked for humanitarian relief and
reconstruction projects in Iraq."
79 Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 11-12. This includes moves toward transferring personal
information about Canadians to U.S. "security agencies unaccountable to [the] Canadian Parliament
and the Canadian public"; massive expansions of the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency's "Big
Brother" database; proposed Lawful Access legislation; and the proposal for a national identity card.
80 George Williams, "Why the ASIO bill is rotten to the core" The Age (27 August 2002) online:
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002108/26/1030053032903.html> (date accessed: 30 June 2003).
81 September 11, supra note 4 at 175. The most significant exception to this point is in the area of
financing terrorism. The Department of Justice Backgrounder on "Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism
Act," supra note 23, as much as admits the legislation to be largely symbolic: "Removing the notion of
political, religious or ideological motivation would transform the definition from one that is designed
to recognize and deal strongly with terrorism to one that is not distinguishable from a general law
enforcement provision in the Criminal Code."
82 Supra note 68.
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impossible as no amount of security can absolutely prevent a determined
individual from attacking an airplane or parking a fertilizer bomb outside
a daycare. Random, horrific acts of violence, their destructiveness limited
only by the ingenuity, evil, or derangement of the perpetrators, cannot be
stopped. Just four months after a terrorist bomb killed and injured
hundreds of people in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002, a massive fire
ripped through a subway train in Taegu, South Korea, killing well over two
hundred people. The subway fire, however, was not terrorism, but merely
the actions of a deranged man armed with a lighter and accelerant. The
chilling ease with which acts of gross violence can be perpetrated by urban
snipers, hijackers, suicide bombers, ex-soldiers with fertilizer bombs, or
madmen with milk cartons of gasoline is clear. Little knowledge, ingenuity,
foresight, planning, intelligence, money, or support infrastructure is
required to achieve mass murder.
Disturbingly, terrorism on a much bigger scale is possible. Mass
destruction is no longer the exclusive privilege of states. A "dirty bomb," for
example, "made with a single foot-long pencil of cobalt from a food
irradiation plant and just 10 pounds of TNT" would render much of
Manhattan "as contaminated as the permanently closed area around the
Chernobyl nuclear plant ...., The degree of difficulty involved in
achieving these results is scarcely more than that involved in filling a rental
truck with fertilizer or a milk carton with gasoline. A visit to any university
laboratory or hospital combined with a side trip to a mining camp or army
reserve base is all that is needed to obtain the raw materials. Well-
organized terrorists could aspire to much more, much aided by the
continuing insecurity of both nuclear materials and of the world's nuclear
arsenal. A one kiloton nuclear explosion ("a junk bomb, hardly worthy of
respect, a fifteenth the power of the bomb over Hiroshima") detonated in
central New York would produce:
... 20,000 dead in a matter of seconds. Beyond this, to a distance of more than a quarter mile,
anyone directly exposed to the fireball would die a gruesome death from radiation sickness
within a day ... This larger circle would be populated by about a quarter million people on
a workday. Half a mile from the explosion ... unshielded onlookers would expect a slower
death from radiation. A mushroom cloud of irradiated debris would blossom more than two
miles into the air, and then, ... highly lethal fallout would begin drifting back to earth,
showering injured survivors and dooming rescue workers. The poison would ride for 5 or 10
miles on the prevailing winds .... 84
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Bill Keller "Nuclear Nightmares" New York Times Magazine (26 May 2002) online:
< http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/magazine/26NUKES.html?ex= 1023640203&ei = 1 &en =dc0fb
9fac851dd13> (date accessed: 30 June 2003).
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Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare?
The massive incursions in civil liberties since 9/11 have done little
to protect us from such possibilities. Indeed, U.S. nuclear expert Eugene
Harbiger considers it impossible to protect against such possibilities,
stating, "It's not a matter of if; it's a matter of when."8'
We are left, then, with the unfortunate conclusion that Canada's
new laws violate the very constitutional values that render our society
"civil," while simultaneously failing to protect us from terrorism. The
misleading freedom versus security dichotomy distorts dangerously,
reinforcing our cultural obsession with the notoriously blunt instruments of
coercive law, while distracting attention entirely from potentially more
useful measures. The uni-dimensional focus on coercive law has lead us to
overlook a wide range of "security-enhancing measures we could take that
would have no effect on freedom." Recognition "that virtually none of our
computer systems, utilities, and urban infrastructure had been designed
from the ground up with security in mind" would allow us to begin to
engage in "a massive redesign of infrastructure ... that could do wonders
for security while not affecting freedom in the least."86 Though it is
probably impossible to prevent deranged people from fire-bombing
subways or nightclubs, it is possible to improve design standards, so as to
make subways, nightclubs, and cities safer. It is also possible, given the
political will, to develop better systems of emergency response and to more
effectively regulate both international arms proliferation and the highly
dangerous materials that are in common industrial use.
The regulatory state has much to offer where the police state lets
us down. Disturbingly, little attention has been focused on such matters to
date.
X. CONCLUSION
Soon after 9/11, Paul Krugman warned of "hitchhikers" hijacking
"the patriotic bandwagon" and using it "as a vehicle for their favorite policy
proposals."87
Canada's response to the challenges of international terrorism has
been, through entirely conventional means, reflecting the interests of
85 Ibid.
86 A. Potter, "How much freedom should we trade for our security?" [unpublished, archived with
the author], referencing Philip Agre, "Some notes on War in a World Without Boundaries," online:
<http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/notes-on-war.html> (date accessed: 31 July 2003).
87 Paul Krugman "Reckonings; The Hitchhiker Syndrome" The New York Times (30 September
2001) online: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0613F93C590C738FDDA
00894D9404482> (date accessed: 30 June 2003).
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established state agencies. The knee-jerk reaction of security bureaucrats
has been to move further in the preferred directions of concentrating
power, constraining liberties, and enhancing both criminal justice and
security bureaucracies. It does not augur well that, so far, equivalent efforts
in the direction of controlling dangerous materials, improving urban and
systems design, or enhancing emergency response capabilities, have sadly
been lacking in our new state of permanent war.
It is a real possibility that security establishment "hitchhikers,"
empowered by widely shared, though misleading, notions of crime and
safety, have dangerously distorted Canada's constitutional balance, while
simultaneously diverting attention from the difficult challenges involved in
enhancing public safety.
